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Abstract
One intriguing property of deep neural networks (DNNs) is
their inherent vulnerability to backdoor attacks – a trojaned
model responds to trigger-embedded inputs in a highly pre-
dictable manner while functioning normally otherwise. Sur-
prisingly, despite the plethora of prior work on DNNs for con-
tinuous data (e.g., images), little is known about the vulnera-
bility of graph neural networks (GNNs) for discrete-structured
data (e.g., graphs), which is highly concerning given their in-
creasing use in security-sensitive domains.
To bridge this gap, we present GTA, the first backdoor
attack on GNNs. Compared with prior work, GTA departs
in significant ways: graph-oriented – it defines triggers as
specific subgraphs, including both topological structures and
descriptive features, entailing a large design spectrum for the
adversary; input-tailored – it dynamically adapts triggers to
individual graphs, thereby optimizing both attack effective-
ness and evasiveness; downstream model-agnostic – it can be
readily launched without knowledge regarding downstream
models or fine-tuning strategies; and attack-extensible – it can
be instantiated for both transductive (e.g., node classification)
and inductive (e.g., graph classification) tasks, constituting
severe threats for a range of security-critical applications (e.g.,
toxic chemical classification). Through extensive evaluation
using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art models, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of GTA: for instance, on pre-
trained, off-the-shelf GNNs, GTA attains over 99.2% attack
success rate with merely less than 0.3% accuracy drop. We
further provide analytical justification for its effectiveness
and discuss potential countermeasures, pointing to several
promising research directions.
1 Introduction
Today’s machine learning (ML) systems are large, complex
software artifacts. Due to the ever-increasing system scale and
training cost, it becomes not only tempting but also necessary
to re-use pre-trained models in building ML systems. It was
estimated that as of 2016, over 13.7% of ML-related reposito-
ries on GitHub use at least one pre-trained model [24]. On the
upside, this “plug-and-play” paradigm significantly simplifies
the development cycles of ML systems [46]. On the downside,
as most pre-trained models are contributed by untrusted third
parties (e.g., ModelZoo [5]), their lack of standardization or
regulation entails profound security implications.
In particular, pre-trained models are exploitable to launch
backdoor attacks [19, 32], one immense threat to the security
of ML systems. In such attacks, a trojaned model forces its
host system to misbehave when certain pre-defined conditions
(“triggers”) are present but function normally otherwise. Such
attacks can result in consequential damages such as mislead-
ing autonomous vehicles to crashing [55], maneuvering video
surveillance to miss illegal activities [11], and manipulating
biometric authentication to allow improper access [2].
Motivated by this, intensive research has been conducted
on backdoor attacks on general deep neural network (DNN)
models, either developing new attack variants [9,19,24,28,32,
47, 49, 65] or improving DNN resilience against existing at-
tacks [7,8,10,13,16,31,56]. Surprisingly, despite this plethora
of prior work, little is known about the vulnerabilities of graph
neural network (GNN) models to backdoor attacks. This is
highly concerning given that GNNs have achieved state-of-
the-art performance in many graph learning tasks [22, 26, 54]
and pre-trained GNNs have gained increasing use in security-
sensitive applications [23, 48, 59]. In this paper, we seek to
bridge this gap by answering the following questions:
• RQ1 – Are GNNs ever susceptible to backdoor attacks?
• RQ2 – Particularly, how effective are the attacks in various
practical settings (e.g., on off-the-shelf GNNs)?
• RQ3 – Further, what are the possible root causes of such
vulnerabilities?
• RQ4 – Finally, what are the potential countermeasures
against such backdoor attacks?
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Figure 1: Illustration of backdoor attacks on molecular structure graphs from
the AIDS dataset [44]: (a) original graphs; (b) universal trigger-embedded
graphs; (c) adaptive trigger-embedded graphs.
Our work – This work represents the design, implemen-
tation, and evaluation of GTA,1 the first backdoor attack on
1GTA: Graph Trojaning Attack.
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GNNs. Compared with prior work on backdoor attacks (e.g.,
[9, 19, 32]), GTA departs in significant ways.
Graph-oriented – Unlike structured, continuous data (e.g.,
images), graph data is inherently unstructured and discrete, re-
quiring triggers to be of the same nature. GTA defines triggers
as specific subgraphs, including both topological structures
and descriptive (node and edge) features, which entails a large
design spectrum for the adversary.
Input-tailored – Instead of defining a fixed trigger for all the
graphs, GTA generates triggers tailored to the characteristics
(topological structures and descriptive features) of individual
graphs, which optimizes both attack effectiveness (e.g., mis-
classification confidence) and evasiveness (e.g., perturbation
magnitude). Figure 1 illustrates how GTA adapts triggers to
specific input graphs (more samples in Appendix C).
Downstream-model-agnostic – We assume a realistic set-
ting wherein the adversary has no knowledge regarding down-
stream models or fine-tuning strategies. Rather than relying
on final predictions, GTA optimizes trojaned GNNs with re-
spect to intermediate representations, leading to its resistance
to varying system design choices.
Attack-extensible – GTA represents a general attack frame-
work that can be readily instantiated for various settings, such
as inductive (e.g., graph classification) and transductive (e.g.,
node classification) tasks, thereby constituting severe threats
for a range of security-critical applications (e.g., toxic chemi-
cal classification).
To validate the practicality of GTA, we conduct a com-
prehensive empirical study using a range of state-of-the-art
models (e.g., GCN [26], GRAPHSAGE [22], GAT [54]) and
benchmark datasets (e.g., Fingerprint [37], Malware [43], Tox-
icant [51]), leading to the following interesting findings.
RA1 – We demonstrate that GNNs are highly vulnerable
to backdoor attacks. Across all the cases, the trojaned mod-
els force their host systems to misclassify trigger-embedded
graphs to target classes with over 91.4% success rate while
incurring merely less than 1.4% accuracy drop.
RA2 – We further evaluate GTA on pre-trained GNNs “in
the wild”. On off-the-shelf models pre-trained under the multi-
task setting [23], GTA attains even higher (over 96.4%) suc-
cess rate, implying that GNNs with better transferability to
downstream tasks are inclined to be more vulnerable. We also
extend GTA to a transductive setting and show that it is able
to cause the misclassification of target nodes with over 69.1%
success rate, indicating that transductive tasks are equally
susceptible to backdoor attacks.
RA3 – Besides empirically showing the practicality of GTA,
we also provide possible analytical justification for their ef-
fectiveness, which points to the unprecedented complexity of
today’s GNNs (e.g., multiple aggregation layers and millions
of model parameters). This allows the adversary to precisely
maneuver the models to “memorize” trigger patterns without
affecting their generalizability on benign inputs.
RA4 – Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures and
their technical challenges. Although it is straightforward to
conceive high-level mitigation such as more principled prac-
tice of re-using pre-trained GNNs, it is challenging to con-
cretely implement such strategies. For instance, inspecting a
pre-trained GNN for potential backdoors amounts to search-
ing for abnormal “shortcut” patterns in the input space [56],
which entails non-trivial challenges due to the discrete struc-
tures of graph data and the prohibitive complexity of GNNs.
Even worse, because of the adaptive nature of GTA, such
shortcuts may vary with individual graphs, rendering them
even more evasive to detection.
Contributions – To our best knowledge, this work repre-
sents the first in-depth study on the vulnerabilities of GNN
models to backdoor attacks. Our contributions can be summa-
rized as follows.
• We present GTA, the first backdoor attack on GNNs, which
highlights with the following features: (i) it uses subgraphs
as trigger patterns; (ii) it tailors trigger to individual graphs;
(iii) it assumes no knowledge regarding downstream models
or fine-tuning strategies; (iv) it also applies to both inductive
and transductive tasks.
• We conduct an empirical study of GTA using various state-
of-the-art GNNs and benchmark datasets, and demonstrate
that GTA is effective in a range of security-critical tasks,
evasive to detection, and agnostic to downstream models.
The evaluation characterizes the inherent vulnerabilities of
GNNs to backdoor attacks.
• We further provide analytical justification for the effective-
ness of GTA and discuss potential mitigation. This analysis
sheds light on improving the current practice of re-using
pre-trained GNN models, which points to several promising
research directions.
Roadmap – The remainder of the paper proceeds as fol-
lows. § 2 introduces fundamental concepts; § 3 presents GTA,
the first backdoor attack on GNNs; § 4 conducts an empirical
study of GTA in both inductive and transductive tasks; § 5 pro-
vides analytical justification for the effectiveness of GTA and
discusses potential mitigation; § 6 surveys relevant literature;
and the paper is concluded in § 7.
2 Background
We first introduce a set of fundamental concepts and assump-
tions used throughout the paper. The important notations are
summarized in Table 1.
2.1 Preliminaries
Graph neural network (GNN) – A GNN model takes as
input a graph G, including its topological structures and de-
scriptive (node and/or edge) attributes, and generates a repre-
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Notation Definition
G,yG graph, class
fθ◦ , fθ original, trojaned GNN
yt target class
h downstream classifier
gt trigger subgraph
mgt (·) mixing function
φω(·) trigger generation function
ntrigger trigger size
nio inner-outer optimization ratio
Table 1. Symbols and notations.
sentation (embedding) zv for each node v ∈ G. Below we use
Z to denote the node embeddings in the matrix form.
Here we mainly consider GNNs built upon the neighbor-
hood aggregation approach (e.g., GCN [26], GRAPHSAGE
[22], and GAT [54]):
Z(k) = Aggregate
(
A,Z(k−1);θ(k)
)
(1)
where Z(k) is the node embeddings computed after the k-th
iteration and also the “messages” to be passed to neighboring
nodes, and the aggregation function depends on the adja-
cency matrix A, the trainable parameters θ(k), and the node
embeddings Z(k−1) from the previous iteration. Often Z(0) is
initialized as G’s node features.
To obtain the graph embedding zG, a readout function (typ-
ically permutation-invariant [66]) pools the node embeddings
from the final iteration K:
zG = Readout
(
Z(K)
)
(2)
Overall, a GNN models a function f that generates a repre-
sentation zG = f (G) for a given graph G.
Pre-trained GNN – With the widespread use of GNN mod-
els, it becomes attractive to reuse pre-trained GNNs for do-
mains wherein either labeled data is sparse [23] or training is
expensive [67]. Under the transfer setting, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, a pre-trained GNN f is composed with a downstream
classifier h to form an end-to-end system. For instance, in a
toxic chemical classification task, given a molecular graph G,
it is first mapped to its embedding zG = f (G) and then clas-
sified as yG = h(zG). Compared with f , h is typically much
simpler (e.g., one fully-connected layer).
It is noted that the data to pre-train f tends to differ from
the downstream task but share similar features (e.g., general
versus toxic molecules). Therefore it is necessary to fine-tune
the system (often in a supervised manner). One may opt to
perform full-tuning to train both f and h or partial-tuning to
only train h but with f fixed [24].
Backdoor attack – At a high level, using trojaned models
as the attack vector, backdoor attacks inject malicious func-
tions into target systems, which are invoked when certain
pre-defined conditions (“triggers”) are present.
Given the increasing use of DNNs in security-critical do-
mains, the adversary is strongly incentivized to forge trojaned
models and lure users to re-use them. Typically, a trojaned
Trigger-embedded 
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Figure 2: Illustration of backdoor attacks on GNN models.
model responds to trigger-embedded inputs (e.g., images with
specific watermarks) in a highly predictable manner (e.g.,
misclassified to a particular class) but functions normally
otherwise [19, 24, 32]; once it is integrated into a target sys-
tem [19], the adversary invokes such malicious functions via
trigger-embedded inputs during system use.
2.2 Threat model
We assume a threat model similar to the existing backdoor
attacks [19, 24, 32, 65], as illustrated in Figure 2,
Given a pre-trained GNN fθ◦ (parameterized by θ◦), the
adversary forges a trojaned GNN fθ via perturbing its model
parameters without modifying its network architecture (oth-
erwise detectable by checking f ’s specification). We assume
the adversary has access to a dataset D sampled from the
downstream task. Our empirical evaluation shows that often
a fairly small amount (e.g., 1%) of the training data from the
downstream task suffices (details in § 4). Note that even with-
out direct access to such data, it is often possible to synthesize
data to launch backdoor attacks (e.g., [32]).
After integrating fθ with a downstream classifier h to form
the end-to-end system, the user performs fine-tuning for the
downstream task. To make the attack more practical, we as-
sume the adversary has no knowledge regarding what classi-
fier h is used (i.e., design choices) or how the system is tuned
(i.e., fine-tuning strategies).
3 GTA Attack
Next we describe GTA, the first backdoor attack on GNN
models. At a high level, GTA forges trojaned GNNs, which,
once integrated into downstream tasks, cause host systems to
respond to trigger-embedded graphs in a highly predictable
manner but function normally otherwise.
3.1 Attack overview
For simplicity, we exemplify with the graph classification task
to illustrate GTA and discuss its extension to other settings
(e.g., transductive learning) in § 3.6.
Given a pre-trained GNN θ◦,2 the adversary aims to forge a
trojaned model θ so that in the downstream task, θ forces the
host system to misclassify all the trigger-embedded graphs to
2As GTA does not modify the model architecture, below we use θ to refer
to both the model and it parameter configuration.
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Figure 3: Overall framework of GTA attack.
a designated class yt , while functioning normally on benign
graphs. Formally, we define the trigger as a subgraph gt (in-
cluding both topological structures and descriptive features),
and a mixing function mgt (·) that blends gt with a given graph
G to generate a trigger-embedded graph mgt (G). Therefore,
the adversary’s objective can be defined as:{
h◦ fθ(mgt (G)) = yt
h◦ fθ(G) = h◦ fθ◦(G)
(3)
where h is the downstream classifier after fine-tuning and G
denotes an arbitrary graph in the task. Intuitively, the first
objective specifies that all the trigger-embedded graphs are
misclassified to the target class (i.e., attack effectiveness),
while the second objective ensures that the original and tro-
janed GNNs are indistinguishable in terms of their behaviors
on benign graphs (i.e., attack evasiveness).
However, searching for the optimal trigger gt and trojaned
model θ in Eq (3) entails non-trivial challenges.
• As the adversary has no access to downstream model h, it
is impractical to directly optimize gt and θ based on Eq (3).
• Due to the mutual dependence of gt and θ, every time up-
dating gt requires the expensive re-computation of θ.
• There are combinatorial ways to blend gt with a given graph
G, implying a prohibitive search space.
• Using a universal trigger gt for all the graphs ignores the
characteristics of individual graphs, resulting in suboptimal
and easy-to-detect attacks.
To the above challenges, (i) instead of associating gt and θ
with final predictions, we optimize them with respect to inter-
mediate representations; (ii) we adopt a bi-level optimization
formulation, which considers gt as the hyper-parameters and
θ as the model parameters and optimizes them in an interleav-
ing manner; (iii) we implement the mixing function mgt (G)
as an efficient substitution operator, which finds and replaces
within G the subgraph g most similar to gt ; and (iv) we intro-
duce the concept of adaptive trigger, that is, gt is specifically
optimized for each given graph G.
The overall framework of GTA is illustrated in Figure 3. In
the following, we elaborate on each key component.
3.2 Bi-level optimization
Recall that the adversary has access to a dataset D sampled
from the downstream task, which comprises a set of instances
(G,yG) with G being a graph and yG as its class. We formulate
the following bi-level optimization objective [15] with gt and
θ as the upper- and lower-level variables.
g∗t = argmingt
`atk(θ∗(gt),gt)
s.t. θ∗(gt) = argmin
θ
`ret(θ,gt)
(4)
where `atk and `ret represent the losses terms respectively
quantifying attack effectiveness and accuracy retention, cor-
responding the objectives defined in Eq (3).
Without access to downstream classifier h, instead of asso-
ciating `atk and `ret with final predictions, we define them in
terms of intermediate representations. Specifically, we parti-
tion D into two parts, Dyt – the graphs in the target class yt
and D\yt – the ones in the other classes; `atk enforces that fθ
generates similar embeddings for the graphs in Dyt and those
in D\yt once embedded with gt . Meanwhile, `ret ensures that
fθ and fθ◦ produce similar embeddings for the graphs in D.
Formally, we define:
`atk(θ,gt) = EG∈D\yt ,G′∈Dyt ∆
(
fθ(mgt (G)), fθ(G
′)
)
(5)
`ret(θ,gt) = EG∈D ∆( fθ(G), fθ◦(G)) (6)
where ∆(·, ·) measures the embedding dissimilarity, which is
instantiated as L2 distance in our current implementation.
However, exactly solving Eq (4) is expensive. Due to the bi-
level optimization structure, it requires re-computing θ (i.e.,
re-training f over D) whenever gt is updated. Instead, we
propose an approximate solution that iteratively optimizes gt
and θ by alternating between gradient descent on `atk and `ret
respectively.
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Specifically, at the i-th iteration, given the current trigger
g(i−1)t and model θ(i−1), we first compute θ(i) by gradient de-
scent on `ret, with g
(i−1)
t fixed. In practice, we may run this step
for nio iterations. The parameter nio, inner-outer optimization
ratio, essentially balances the optimization of `atk and `ret. We
then obtain g(i)t by minimizing `atk after a single look-ahead
step of gradient descent with respect to θ(i). Formally, the
gradient with respect to gt is approximated by:
∇gt`atk
(
θ∗(g(i−1)t ),g
(i−1)
t
)
≈∇gt`atk
(
θ(i)−ξ∇θ`ret
(
θ(i),g(i−1)t
)
,g(i−1)t
) (7)
where ξ is the learning rate of the look-ahead step.
The rationale behind this procedure is as follows. While
it is difficult to directly minimize `atk(θ∗(gt),gt) with respect
to gt , we use a single-step unrolled model as a surrogate of
θ∗(gt). A similar technique is also used in [15]. The details of
evaluating Eq (7) are given in Appendix A.
3.3 Mixing function
The mixing function mgt (G) specifies how the trigger sub-
graph gt is embedded into a given graph G. Apparently, there
are combinatorial ways to define mgt (G), resulting in a pro-
hibitively large search space.
To address this challenge, we restrict the mixing function
to an efficient substitution operator; that is, mgt (G) replaces a
subgraph g in G with gt . To maximize the attack evasiveness,
it is desirable to use a subgraph similar to gt . We thus specify
the constraints that (i) g and gt are of the same size (i.e., the
number of nodes) and (ii) they have the minimum graph edit
distance (i.e., edge addition or deletion).
It is known that finding in a given graph G a subgraph g
identical to gt (subgraph isomorphism) is NP-hard. We adapt
a backtracking-based algorithm VF2 [38] for our setting. In-
tuitively, VF2 recursively extends a partial match by mapping
the next node in gt to a node in G; if it is feasible, it extends
the partial match and recurses, and backtracks otherwise. As
we search for the most similar subgraph, we maintain the cur-
rent highest similarity and terminate a partial match early if it
exceeds this threshold. Algorithm 1 sketches the implementa-
tion of the mixing function.
3.4 Trigger generation
In the formulation of Eq (4), we assume a universal trigger
subgraph gt for all the graphs. Despite its simplicity for im-
plementation, fixing the trigger entails much room for opti-
mization: (i) it ignores the characteristics of individual graphs
and results in less effective attacks; (ii) it becomes a pattern
shared by trigger-embedded graphs and makes them easily
detectable. We thus postulate whether it is possible to gen-
erate triggers tailored to individual graphs to maximize the
attack effectiveness and evasiveness.
Algorithm 1: Mixing function mgt (G)
Input: gt - trigger subgraph; G - target graph;
Output: g - subgraph in G to be replaced
// initialization
1 cbest← ∞, M← /0, gbest← /0;
2 specify a topological order v0,v1, . . . ,vn−1 over gt ;
3 foreach node u in G do
4 add (u,v0) to M;
5 while M 6= /0 do
6 (u j,vi)← top pair of M;
7 if i = n−1 then
// all nodes in gt covered by M
8 compute M’s distance as ccur;
9 if ccur < cbest then cbest← ccur, gbest← G’s part in M ;
10 pop top pair off M;
11 else
12 if there exists extensible pair (uk,vi+1) then
13 if M’s distance < cbest then add (uk,vi+1) to M;
14 else pop top pair off M;
15 return gbest;
To this end, we design an adaptive trigger generation func-
tion φω(g) (parameterized by ω), which proposes a trigger
gt tailored to a given subgraph g within G. Intuitively, φω(g)
optimizes gt with respect to g’s features and its context within
G. To design this function, we need to answer three questions:
(i) how to encode g’s features and context? (ii) how to map
g’s encoding to gt? (iii) how to resolve the mutual dependence
of g and gt as reflected in the mixing function g = mgt (G) and
the trigger generation function gt = φω(g)?
How to encode g’s features and context? To encode g’s
topological structures and node features as well as its context
within G, we resort to the recent advances of graph attention
mechanisms [54]. Intuitively, for a given pair of nodes i, j, we
compute an attention coefficient αi j specifying j’s importance
with respect to i, based on their node features and topological
relationship; we then generate i’s encoding as the aggregation
of its neighboring encodings (weighted by their corresponding
attention coefficients) after applying a non-linearity. We train
the attention network (details in Table 9) using D . Below we
denote by zi ∈ Rd the encoding of node i (d is the encoding
dimensionality).
How to map g’s encoding to gt ? Recall that gt comprises
two parts, its topological structures and node features. For
two nodes i, j ∈ g, we define their connectivity A˜i j in gt using
their parameterized cosine similarity:
A˜i j = 1z>i W>c Wcz j≥‖Wczi‖‖Wcz j‖/2 (8)
where Wc ∈ Rd×d is learnable and 1p is an indicator function
returning 1 if p is true and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, i and j are
connected in gt if their similarity score exceeds 0.5.
Meanwhile, for each node i∈ g, we define its corresponding
feature X˜i in gt as X˜i = σ(Wfzi +bf), where Wf ∈Rd×d and bf ∈
Rd are learnable, and σ(·) is a non-linear activation function.
For instance, for a domain wherein all feature values are non-
negative, we instantiate σ(·) with ReLU; for a domain wherein
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both positive and negative values are possible, we instantiate
σ(·) with Tanh scaled by the domain range.
In the following, we refer to Wc, Wf, and bf collectively as
ω, and the mapping from g’s encoding to {X˜i} (i ∈ g) and
{A˜i j} (i, j ∈ g) as the trigger generation function φω(g).
How to resolve the dependence of g and gt ? Astute read-
ers may point out that the mixing function g = mgt (G) and
the trigger generation function gt = φω(g) are mutually de-
pendent; that is, the generation of gt relies on g to be replaced
in G, while the selection of g depends on gt . To resolve this
“chicken-and-egg” problem, we update g and gt in an inter-
leaving manner during optimization.
Specifically, initialized with a randomly selected subgraph
g, at the i-th iteration, we first optimize the trigger generation
function to update the trigger g(i)t , and then update the selected
subgraph g(i) based on g(i)t .
3.5 Implementation and optimization
Putting everything together, Algorithm 2 sketches the flow
of GTA attack. At its core, it alternates between updating
the model θ, the trigger generation function φω(·), and the
selected subgraph g for each G ∈D\yt (line 4 to 6). Below we
present a suite of optimization to improve the attack.
Algorithm 2: GTA (inductive) attack
Input: θ◦ - pre-trained GNN; D - data from downstream task; yt -
target class;
Output: θ - trojaned GNN; ω - parameters of trigger generation
function
// initialization
1 randomly initialize ω;
2 foreach G ∈D\yt do randomly sample g∼ G;
// bi-level optimization
3 while not converged yet do
// updating trojaned GNN
4 update θ by descent on ∇θ`ret(θ,gt) (cf. Eq (6));
// updating trigger generation function
5 update ω by descent on ∇ω`atk(θ−ξ∇θ`ret(θ,gt),gt) (cf. Eq (7));
// updating subgraph selection
6 for G ∈D\yt do update g with mφω(g)(G);
7 return (θ,ω);
Multi-step look-ahead – In implementing Algorithm 2,
instead of a single step look-ahead, we apply multiple gradient
descent steps in both updating θ (line 4) and computing the
surrogate model θ∗(gt) (line 5), which is observed to lead to
faster convergence in our empirical evaluation.
Periodical reset – Recall that we update the model with
gradient descent on `ret. As the number of update steps in-
creases, this estimate may deviate significantly from the true
model trained on D, which negatively impacts the attack ef-
fectiveness. To address this, periodically (e.g., every 20 iter-
ations), we replace the estimate with the true model θ∗(gt)
thoroughly trained based on the current trigger gt .
Subgraph stabilization – It is observed in our empirical
evaluation that stabilizing the selected subgraph g for each
G ∈ D\yt by running the subgraph update step (line 6) for
multiple iterations (e.g., 5 times), with the trigger generation
function fixed, often leads to faster convergence.
Feature masking – Algorithm 2 replaces the feature Xi of
each node i ∈ g with its corresponding feature X˜i in gt . To
improve the trigger evasiveness, we may restrict the replace-
ment to certain features: vmsk  Xi + (1− vmsk) X˜i, where
the mask vmsk is a binary vector and  denotes element-wise
multiplication. Intuitively, the j-th feature of X˜i is retained if
the j-th bit of vmsk is on and replaced by the j-th feature of X˜i
otherwise. By limiting the cardinality of vmsk, we upper-bound
the number of features to be replaced.
Model restoration – Once the trojaned GNN fθ is trained,
the adversary may opt to restore the original classifier h with
respect to the pre-training task. Recall that due to the backdoor
injection, h no longer matches fθ. The adversary may fine-
tune h using the training data from the pre-training task. This
step makes the accuracy of the released model h◦ fθ match
its claims, thereby passing normal model inspection [65].
Algorithm 3: GTA (transductive) attack
Input: θ◦ - pre-trained GNN; G - target graph; yt - target class;
Output: θ - trojaned GNN; ω - parameters of trigger generation
function
// initialization
1 randomly initialize ω;
2 randomly sample subgraphs {g} ∼ G;
// bi-level optimization
3 while not converged yet do
// updating trojaned GNN
4 update θ by descent on ∇θ`ret(θ,gt) (cf. Eq (10));
// updating trigger generation function
5 update ω by descent on ∇ω`atk(θ−ξ∇θ`ret(θ,gt),gt) (cf. Eq (9));
6 return (θ,ω);
3.6 Extension to transductive learning
We now discuss the extension of GTA to a transductive setting:
given a graph G and a set of labeled nodes, the goal is to infer
the classes of the remaining unlabeled nodes VU [69].
To extend GTA to this setting, we make the following as-
sumptions. The adversary has access to G as well as the
classifier. For simplicity, we denote by fθ(v;G) the complete
system that classifies a given node v within G. Further, given
an arbitrary subgraph g in G, by substituting g with the trigger
gt , the adversary aims to force the unlabeled nodes within
K hops to g to be misclassified to the target class yt , where
K is the number GNN layers. Recall that for neighborhood
aggregation-based GNNs, a node exerts its influence to other
nodes at most K hops away; this goal upper-bounds the attack
effectiveness the adversary is able to achieve.
We re-define the loss functions in Eq (5) and (6) as:
`atk(θ,gt) = Eg∼GEv∈NK(g)`( fθ(v;G	g⊕gt),yt) (9)
`ret(θ,gt) = Eg∼GEv∈VU\NK(g)`( fθ(v;G	g⊕gt), fθ◦(v;G)) (10)
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Dataset # Graphs (|G |) Avg. # Nodes (|V |) Avg. # Edges (|E |) # Classes (|Y |) # Graphs [Class] Target Class yt
Fingerprint 1,661 8.15 6.81 4 538 [0], 517 [1], 109 [2], 497 [3] 2
Malware 1,361 606.33 745.34 2 546 [0], 815 [1] 0
AIDS 2,000 15.69 16.20 2 400 [0], 1,600 [1] 0
Toxicant 10,315 18.67 19.20 2 8,982 [0], 1,333 [1] 1
Bitcoin 1 5,664 19,274 2 1,556 [0], 4,108 [1] 0
Facebook 1 12,539 108,742 4 4,731 [0], 1,255 [1], 2,606 [2], 3,947 [3] 1
Table 2. Dataset statistics: # Graphs - number of graphs in the dataset; Avg. # Nodes - average number of nodes per graph; Avg. # Edges - average number of
edges per graph; # Classes - number of classes; # Graph [Class] - number of graphs in each [class]; Target Class - target class designated by the adversary.
whereNK(g) is the set of nodes within K hops of g, G	g⊕gt
is G after substituting g with gt , and `(·, ·) is a proper loss
function (e.g., cross entropy). Also, given that g is selected
by the adversary, the mixing function is not necessary. The
complete attack is sketched in Algorithm 3.
4 Attack Evaluation
Next we conduct an empirical study of GTA on benchmark
datasets, state-of-the-art GNN models, and security-critical
applications. Specifically, our experiments are designed to
answer three key questions.
Q1 – How effective/evasive is GTA in inductive tasks?
Q2 – How effective is it on pre-trained, off-the-shelf GNNs?
Q3 – How effective/evasive is it in transductive tasks?
We first introduce the setting of our empirical study.
Experimental settings
Datasets – In the evaluation, we primarily use 6 datasets
drawn from security-sensitive domains. (i) Fingerprint [37] –
graph representations of fingerprint shapes from the NIST-4
database [60]; (ii) Malware [43] – function call graphs of
malware and goodware; (iii) AIDS [44] and (iv) Toxicant [51] –
molecular structure graphs of active and inactive compounds;
(v) Bitcoin [14] – an anonymized Bitcoin transaction network
with each node (transaction) labeled as legitimate or illicit;
and (vi) Facebook [45] – a page-page relationship network
with each node (Facebook page) annotated with the page
properties (e.g., place, organization, product). The detailed
statistics of the datasets are summarized in Table 2. Among
them, we use the first 4 datasets (i-iv) for the inductive setting
and the rest 2 (v-vi) for the transductive setting.
Models – In our evaluation, we use 3 state-of-the-art GNN
models: GCN [26], GRAPHSAGE [21, 22], and GAT [54].
Using GNNs of distinct network architectures (i.e., graph
convolution, general aggregation function, versus graph at-
tention), we factor out the influence of the characteristics of
individual models. The performance of systems built upon
benign GNN models is summarized in Table 3.
Attacks – To our best knowledge, GTA is the first backdoor
attack against GNN models. We thus mainly compare GTA
among its variants: GTAI– it fixes the trigger’s topological
connectivity as a complete graph, and only optimizes a global
Dataset Setting GNN Accuracy
Fingerprint Inductive (Fingerprint→Fingerprint) GAT 82.9%
Malware Inductive (Malware→Malware) GraphSAGE 86.5%
AIDS Inductive (Toxiant→AIDS) GCN 93.9%
Toxicant Inductive (AIDS→Toxiant) GCN 95.4%
AIDS Inductive (ChEMBL→AIDS) GCN 90.4%
Toxicant Inductive (ChEMBL→Toxiant) GCN 94.1%
Bitcoin Transductive GAT 96.3%
Facebook Transductive GraphSAGE 83.8%
Table 3. Accuracy of benign GNN models (Tptr→ Tdst indicates the transfer
from pre-training domain Tptr to downstream domain Tdst).
node feature for each dimensionality; GTAII– it optimizes the
trigger’s topological connectivity and node features, but both
GTAI and GTAII assume a universal trigger for all the graphs;
then GTAIII– it optimizes the trigger’s topological connectivity
and node features with respect to each given graph. Intuitively,
GTAI, GTAII, and GTAIII represent different levels of trigger
adaptiveness.
In each set of experiments, we apply the same setting across
all the attacks, with the default parameter setting summarized
in Table 9. In particular, in each dataset, we assume the class
with the smallest number of instances to be the target class
yt designated by the adversary (cf. Table 2), to minimize the
impact of unbalanced data distributions.
Metrics – To evaluate attack effectiveness, we use two
metrics: (i) attack success rate (ASR), which measures the
likelihood that the system classifies trigger-embedded inputs
to the target class yt designated by the adversary:
Attack Success Rate (ASR) =
# successful trials
# total trials
(11)
and (ii) average misclassification confidence (AMC), which
is the average confidence score assigned to class yt by the
system with respect to successful attacks. Intuitively, higher
ASR and AMC indicate more effective attacks.
To evaluate the attack evasiveness, we use (i) benign ac-
curacy drop (BAD), which is the classification accuracy dif-
ference of two systems built upon the original GNN fθ◦ and
its trojaned counterpart fθ with respect to benign inputs, and
(ii) average degree difference (ADD), which measures the
average degree difference between given graphs and their
trigger-embedded counterparts.
Q1: Is GTA effective in inductive tasks?
This set of experiments evaluate GTA under the inductive
setting, in which a pre-trained GNN is used in a downstream
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Transfer Setting Available Data Attack Effectiveness (ASR | AMC) Attack Evasiveness (BAD | ADD)
(|D|/|T |) GTAI GTAII GTAIII GTAI GTAII GTAIII
Fingerprint→ Fingerprint 84.4% .862 87.2% .909 100% .997 1.9% 2.8×10−3 1.6% 5.6×10−4 0.9% 4.3×10−4
Malware→Malware 87.2% .780 94.4% .894 100% .973 1.8% 5.6×10−4 1.2% 6.1×10−6 0.0% 2.1×10−5
Toxiant→ AIDS
0.2% 64.1% .818 70.2% .903 91.4% .954 2.3%
1.6×10−2
2.5%
9.3×10−3
2.1%
7.6×10−31% 89.4% .844 95.5% .927 98.0% .996 1.7% 1.3% 1.4%
5% 91.3% .918 97.2% .947 100% .998 0.4% 0.6% 0.2%
AIDS→ Toxiant
0.2% 73.5% .747 77.8% .775 94.3% .923 1.3%
1.4×10−2
0.6%
5.5×10−3
1.0%
6.9×10−31% 80.2% .903 85.5% .927 99.8% .991 0.6% 0.0% 0.4%
5% 84.6% .935 86.1% .976 100% .998 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 4. Attack effectiveness and evasiveness of GTA in inductive tasks (Tptr→ Tdst indicates transfer from pre-training task Tptr to downstream task Tdst).
(a) Fingerprint (b) Malware (c) Toxicant→AIDS (d) AIDS→Toxicant
Figure 4: Impact of trigger size ntrigger on the attack effectiveness and evasiveness of GTA in inductive tasks.
(a) Fingerprint (b) Malware (c) Toxicant→AIDS (d) AIDS→Toxicant
Figure 5: Impact of inner-outer optimization ratio nio on the trade-off of attack effectiveness and evasiveness in inductive tasks.
graph classification task. Based on the relationship between
pre-training and downstream tasks, we consider two scenarios.
(i) Non-transfer – In the case that the two tasks share the
same dataset, we partition the overall dataset T into 40%
and 60% for the pre-training and downstream tasks respec-
tively. We assume the adversary has access to 1% of T (as
D) to forge trojaned models. In the evaluation, we randomly
sample 25% from the downstream dataset to construct trigger-
embedded graphs and another 25% as benign inputs.
(ii) Transfer – In the case that the two tasks use different
datasets, in the pre-training task, we use the whole dataset
for GNN pre-training; in the downstream task, we randomly
partition the dataset T into 40% and 60% for system fine-
tuning and testing respectively. By default, we assume the
adversary has access to 1% of T . Similar to the non-transfer
case, we sample 25% from the testing set of T to build trigger-
embedded graphs and another 25% as benign inputs.
In both non-transfer and transfer cases, we assume the ad-
versary has no knowledge regarding downstream models or
fine-tuning strategies. By default, we use a fully-connected
layer plus a softmax layer as the downstream classifier and
apply full-tuning over both the GNN and classifier.
Attack efficacy – Table 4 summarizes the performance
of different variants of GTA in inductive tasks. We have the
following observations.
Overall, in both non-transfer and transfer settings, all the
attacks achieve high attack effectiveness (each with an attack
success rate over 80.2% and misclassification confidence over
0.78), effectively retain the accuracy of pre-trained GNNs
(with accuracy drop below 1.9%), and incur little impact on
the statistics of input graphs (with average degree difference
below 0.016), which highlights the practicality of backdoor
attacks against GNN models.
In particular, the three attacks are ranked as GTAIII > GTAII
> GTAI in terms of their effectiveness, while GTAIII achieves
almost 100% success rate across all the cases. This may be
explained by that the trigger adaptiveness exploits the char-
acteristics of individual graphs, naturally leading to more
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Transfer Setting Available Data Attack Effectiveness (ASR | AMC) Attack Evasiveness (BAD | ADD)
(|D|/|T |) GTAI GTAII GTAIII GTAI GTAII GTAIII
ChEMBL→ AIDS
0.2% 68.2% .805 77.3% .796 94.4% .937 1.3%
1.6×10−2
2.2%
9.2×10−3
1.5%
7.6×10−31% 92.0% .976 97.5% .994 99.0% .994 1.1% 1.0% 1.2%
5% 98.1% .992 100% .987 100% .995 0.4% 0.7% 0.3%
ChEMBL→ Toxiant
0.2% 78.0% .847 78.8% .876 92.5% .915 0.7%
1.4×10−2
0.3%
8.5×10−3
0.4%
7.0×10−31% 83.5% .929 86.0% .940 96.4% .971 0.6% 0.0% 0.1%
5% 92.7% .956 94.1% .983 99.2% .995 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 5. Attack effectiveness and evasiveness of GTA against pre-trained, off-the-shelf GNN models.
effective attacks. Also note that in the transfer cases, GTAII
attains slightly higher evasiveness (accuracy retention) than
GTAIII. This is perhaps because given its higher flexibility, to
retain the accuracy over benign inputs, GTAIII requires more
data from the downstream task as constraints in its optimiza-
tion. To validate this hypothesis, we increase the amount of
T accessible by the adversary to 5% and measure the perfor-
mance of GTA. It is indeed observed that under this setting
GTAIII attains the highest accuracy retention.
Trigger size ntrigger – We now evaluate the impact of trig-
ger size ntrigger on the performance of GTA. Intuitively, ntrigger
specifies the number of nodes in the trigger subgraph. Fig-
ure 4 measures the attack effectiveness (ASR) and evasiveness
(BAD) of different variants of GTA as ntrigger varies from 2
to 6. Observe that the effectiveness of all the attacks mono-
tonically increases with ntrigger, which is especially evident for
GTAI and GTAII. Intuitively, with larger triggers, the trojaned
GNNs are able to better differentiate trigger-embedded and
benign graphs. In comparison, as GTAIII enjoys the flexibility
of adapting triggers to individual graphs, its effectiveness is
less sensitive to the setting of ntrigger. Meanwhile, the attack
evasiveness of all the attacks slightly decreases as ntrigger grows
(less than 3.6%). This may be explained by that as larger trig-
gers represent more significant graph patterns, the trojaned
GNNs need to dedicate more network capacity to recognize
such patterns, which negatively interferes with the primary
task of classifying benign graphs.
Inner-outer optimization ratio nio – Recall that in the
bi-level optimization framework (cf. Eq (4)), the inner-outer
optimization ratio nio specifies the number of iterations of
optimizing `ret per iteration of optimizing `atk, which balances
the attack effectiveness and evasiveness: by increasing nio, one
emphasizes more on minimizing the difference of original and
trojaned GNNs on benign inputs (i.e., evasiveness). Figure 5
illustrates the performance of GTA as a function of nio in
the inductive tasks. Observe that across all the cases both
the ASR (effectiveness) and BAD (evasiveness) measures
decrease with nio, highlighting their inherent trade-off. Also
note that among the three attacks, GTAIII is the least sensitive
to the setting of nio. This may be explained by that introducing
trigger adaptiveness admits a larger optimization space to
improve both effectiveness and evasiveness.
Q2: Is GTA effective on off-the-shelf GNNs?
Besides models trained from scratch, we also consider pre-
trained GNNs “in the wild” to evaluate the efficacy of GTA
in practical settings. To this end, we use a GCN model3 (de-
tails in Table 9) that is pre-trained with graph-level multi-
task supervised training [23] on the ChEMBL dataset [35],
containing 456K molecules with 1,310 kinds of diverse bio-
chemical assays. We transfer the pre-trained GCN to the tasks
of classifying the AIDS and Toxicant datasets. The default
experimental setting is identical to the transfer case.
Attack efficacy – Table 5 summarizes the attack efficacy
of GTA on the pre-trained GNN under varying settings of the
data available from the downstream task (|D|/|T |). We have
the following observations.
First, across all the cases, the three attacks are ranked as
GTAIII > GTAII > GTAI in terms of their effectiveness, high-
lighting the advantage of using flexible trigger definitions.
Second, the effectiveness of GTA increases as more data
from the downstream task becomes available. For instance,
the ASR of GTAI grows about 30% as |D|/|T | increases from
0.2 to 5% on AIDS. In comparison, GTAIII is fairly insensitive
to the available data. For instance, with |D|/|T | = 0.2%, it
attains over 92.5% ASR on Toxicant.
Third, by comparing Table 4 and 5, it is observed that GTA
appears slightly more effective on the off-the-shelf GNN. For
instance, with |D|/|T |= 5%, GTAII attains 86.1% and 94.1%
ASR on the trained-from-scratch and off-the-shelf GNN mod-
els respectively on AIDS. This is perhaps explained by that
the models pre-trained under the multi-task supervised setting
tend to have superior transferability to downstream tasks [23],
which translates into more effective backdoor attacks and less
reliance on available data.
(a) ChEMBL→AIDS (b) ChEMBL→Toxicant
Figure 6: Impact of trigger size ntrigger on the attack effectiveness
and evasiveness of GTA against off-the-shelf models.
3https://github.com/snap-stanford/pre-train-gnns/
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Trigger size ntrigger – We then evaluate the impact of
trigger size ntrigger on GTA. Figure 6 shows the effectiveness
(ASR) and evasiveness (BAD) of GTA as a function of ntrigger.
It is observed that similar to Figure 4, the effectiveness of all
the attacks monotonically increases with ntrigger and meanwhile
their evasiveness slightly drops (less than 3.6%). It seems
that among the three attacks GTAIII achieves the best balance
between the two objectives, which is perhaps attributed to the
flexibility bestowed by the trigger adaptiveness.
(a) ChEMBL→AIDS (b) ChEMBL→Toxicant
Figure 7: Impact of inner-outer optimization ratio nio on the attack effec-
tiveness and evasiveness of GTA against off-the-shelf models.
Inner-outer optimization ratio nio – Figure 7 illustrates
the performance of GTA as the inner-outer optimization ratio
nio varies from 1 to 8, which shows trends highly similar to the
transfer cases in Figure 5: of all the attacks, their effectiveness
and evasiveness respectively show positive and negative corre-
lation with nio, while GTAIII is the least sensitive to nio. Given
the similar observations on both trained-from-scratch and off-
the-shelf GNNs, it is expected that with proper configuration,
GTA is applicable to a range of settings.
Q3: Is GTA effective in transductive tasks?
Next we evaluate GTA under the transductive setting, in which
given a graph and a set of labeled nodes, the pre-trained GNN
is used to classify the remaining unlabeled nodes. Specifically,
given a subgraph g in G (designated by the adversary), by
replacing g with the trigger gt , the adversary aims to force all
the unlabeled nodes within K hops of gt (including gt itself)
to be classified to target class yt , where K is the number of
layers of the GNN model.
In each task, we randomly partition G’s nodes into 20%
as the labeled set VL and 80% as the unlabeled set VU. We
then randomly sample 100 subgraphs from G as the target
subgraphs {g}. Similar to the inductive attacks, we measure
the attack effectiveness and evasiveness using ASR (AMC)
and BAD respectively. In particular, ASR (AMC) is measured
over the unlabeled nodes within K hops of g, while BAD is
measured over all the other unlabeled nodes.
Attack efficacy – Table 6 summarizes the attack perfor-
mance of GTA. Similar to the inductive case (cf. Table 4), the
three attacks are ranked as GTAIII > GTAII > GTAI in terms
Dataset Effectiveness (ASR% | AMC) Evasiveness (BAD%)
GTAI GTAII GTAIII GTAI GTAII GTAIII
Bitcoin 52.1 .894 68.6 .871 89.7 .926 0.9 1.2 0.9
Facebook 42.6 .903 59.6 .917 69.1 .958 4.0 2.9 2.4
Table 6. Attack effectiveness and evasiveness of GTA in transductive tasks.
of effectiveness; yet, GTAIII outperforms the rest by a larger
margin in the transductive tasks. For instance, on Bitcoin,
GTAIII attains 37.6% and 21.1% higher ASR than GTAI and
GTAII respectively. This may be explained as follows. Com-
pared with the inductive tasks, the graphs in the transductive
tasks tend to be much larger (e.g., thousands versus dozens of
nodes) and demonstrate more complicated topological struc-
tures; being able to adapt trigger patterns to local topological
structures significantly boosts the attack effectiveness. Fur-
ther, between the two datasets, the attacks attain higher ASR
on Bitcoin, which may be attributed to that all the node fea-
tures in Facebook are binary-valued, negatively impacting the
effectiveness of feature perturbation.
(a) Bitcoin (b) Facebook
Figure 8: Impact of trigger size ntrigger on the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness of GTA in transductive tasks.
Trigger size ntrigger – Figure 8 shows the impact of trigger
size ntrigger. Observe that as ntrigger varies from 3 to 15, the ASR
of all the attacks first increases and then slightly drops. We
have a possible explanation as follow. The “influence” of
trigger gt on its neighborhood naturally grows with ntrigger;
meanwhile, the number of unlabeled nodes NK(gt) within
gt’s vicinity also increases super-linearly with ntrigger. Once
the increase of NK(gt) outweighs gt’s influence, the attack
effectiveness tends to decrease. Interestingly, ntrigger seems
have limited impact on GTA’s BAD, which may be attributed
to that gt’s influence is bounded by K hops.
(a) Bitcoin (b) Facebook
Figure 9: Impact of inner-outer optimization ratio nioon the attack effective-
ness and evasiveness of GTA in transductive tasks.
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Inner-outer optimization ratio nio – Figure 9 shows the
efficacy of GTA as a function of the inner-outer optimization
ratio nio. The observations are similar to the inductive case (cf.
Figure 5): of all the attacks, their effectiveness and evasiveness
respectively show positive and negative correlation with nio,
while GTAIII is the least sensitive to nio.
(a) Bitcoin (b) Facebook
Figure 10: Impact of feature mask size nmask on the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness of GTA in transductive tasks.
Feature mask size nmask – Recall that one may optimize
GTA by limiting the number of perturbable features at each
node of the to-be-replaced subgraph (§ 3.5). We now eval-
uate the impact of feature mask size nmask, which specifies
the percentage of perturbable features, with results shown in
Figure 10. Observe that the attack effectiveness shows strong
correlation with nmask. For instance, as nmask varies from 1%
to 50%, the ASR of GTAIII increases by 15% on Bitcoin. Intu-
itively, larger perturbation magnitude leads to more effective
attacks. Meanwhile, nmask negatively impacts the attack eva-
siveness, which is especially evident on Facebook. This can
be explained by: (i) unlike other parameters (e.g., ntrigger), as
it affects the feature extraction of all the nodes, nmask has a
“global” impact on the GNN behaviors; and (ii) as all the fea-
tures of Facebook are binary-valued, nmask tends to have an
even larger influence.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Interactions of trigger size ntrigger and feature mask size nmask
on Bitcoin: (a) nmask = 1%; (b) nmask = 50%.
We are also interested in understanding the interplay be-
tween ntrigger and nmask, which bound triggers in terms of topol-
ogy and feature perturbation respectively. Figure 11 compares
the attack efficacy (as a function of ntrigger) under nmask = 1%
and 50%. When the number of perturbable features is small
(nmask = 1%), increasing the trigger size may negatively im-
pact ASR, due to the super-linear increase of neighboring
size; when nmask = 50%, increasing ntrigger improves the attack
effectiveness, due to the mutual “reinforcement” between fea-
ture and topology perturbation; yet, larger nmask also has more
significant influence on BAD. Therefore, the setting of ntrigger
and nmask needs to carefully balance these factors.
5 Discussion
We now provide analytical justification for the effectiveness
of GTA and discuss potential countermeasures.
Q4: Why is GTA effective?
Today’s GNNs are complex artifacts designed to model highly
non-linear, non-convex functions over graph-structured data.
Recent studies [63] have shown that with GNNs are expres-
sive enough for powerful graph isomorphism tests (e.g., the
Weisfeiler-Lehman test [61]). These observations may par-
tially explain why, with careful perturbation, a GNN is able to
“memorize” trigger-embedded graphs yet without comprising
its generalizability on other benign graphs.
To validate this hypothesis, we empirically assess the im-
pact of model complexity on the attack effectiveness of GTAIII.
We use the transfer case of Toxicant→ AIDS in § 4 as a con-
crete example. We train three distinct GCN models with 1-,
2-, and 3-aggregation layers respectively, representing dif-
ferent levels of model complexity. We measure their overall
accuracy and the ASR of GTAIII on such models.
Metric # GCN Layers
1 2 3
ASR/AMC 95.4%/.997 98.0%/.996 99.1%/.998
Accuracy 92.2% 93.9% 95.2%
Table 7. ASR of GTAIII and overall accuracy as functions of GNN model
complexity (Toxicant→ AIDS).
Table 7 summarizes the results. Observe that increasing
model complexity benefits the attack effectiveness. As the
layer number varies from 1 to 3, the ASR of GTAIII grows by
about 3.7%. It is thus reasonable to postulate the existence
of the correlation between model complexity and attack ef-
fectiveness. Meanwhile, increasing model complexity also
improves the system performance, that is, the overall accuracy
increases by 3%. Therefore, reducing GNN complexity may
not be a viable option for defending against GTA, as it may
negatively impact system performance.
Q5: Why is GTA downstream model-agnostic?
We have shown in § 4 that the effectiveness of GTA seems ag-
nostic to the downstream models. Here we provide a possible
explanation for this phenomenon.
Let G˜ be an arbitrary trigger-embedded graph. Recall that
the optimization of Eq (5) essentially shifts G˜ in the feature
space by minimizing ∆ fθ(G˜) = ‖ fθ(G˜)−EG∼Pyt fθ(G)‖ (with
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respect to classes other than yt), where Pyt is the data distribu-
tion of target class yt .
Now consider the end-to-end system h◦ fθ. Apparently, if
∆h◦ fθ(G˜) = ‖h◦ fθ(G˜)−EG∼Pyt h◦ fθ(G)‖ is minimized (with
respect to classes other than yt), it is likely that G˜ is classified
as yt . One sufficient condition is that∆h◦ fθ is linearly correlated
with∆ fθ : ∆h◦ fθ ∝∆ fθ . If so, we say that the function represented
by downstream model h is pseudo-linear [24].
Yet, compared with GNNs, most downstream models are
fairly simple (e.g., one fully-connected layer) and tend to show
strong pseudo-linearity, making GTA agnostic to downstream
models. One may thus suggest mitigating GTA by adopting
complex downstream models. However, the option may not
be feasible: (i) complex models are difficult to train especially
when the training data is limited, which is often the case in
transfer learning; and (ii) the ground-truth mapping from the
feature space to the output space may be indeed pseudo-linear,
independent of downstream models.
Q6: Why is GTA difficult to defend against?
As GTA represents a new class of backdoor attacks, one pos-
sibility is to adopt existing mitigation in other domains (e.g.,
images) to defend against GTA. Below we evaluate the effec-
tiveness of this strategy.
Detection design – We aim to detect suspicious GNNs and
potential backdoors at the model inspection stage [8, 31, 56].
We consider NEURALCLEANSE [56] as a representative
method, upon which we build our defense against GTA. In-
tuitively, given a DNN, NEURALCLEANSE searches for po-
tential backdoors in every class. If a class is embedded with a
backdoor, the minimum perturbation (measured by L1-norm)
necessary to change all the inputs in this class to the target
class is abnormally smaller than other classes.
To apply this defense in our context, we introduce the defi-
nition below. Given trigger gt and to-be-replaced subgraph g,
let gt comprise nodes v1, . . . ,vn and g correspondingly com-
prise u1, . . . ,un. The cost of substituting g with gt is measured
by the L1 distance of their concatenated features:
∆(gt ,g) = ‖Xv1 unionmulti . . .unionmultiXvn−Xu1 unionmulti . . .unionmultiXun‖1 (12)
where Xvi is vi’s feature vector and unionmulti denotes the concate-
nation operator. Intuitively, this measure accounts for both
topology and feature perturbation.
We assume a set of benign graphs D . Let Dy be the subset
of D in class y and D\y as the rest. For each class y, we search
for the optimal trigger gt to change the classification of all the
graphs in D\y to y. The optimality is defined in terms of the
minimum perturbation cost (MPC):
min
gt
∑
G∈D\y
min
g⊂G
∆(gt ,g) s.t. h◦ fθ(G	g⊕gt) = y (13)
where G	g⊕gt denotes G after substituting g with gt .
Recall that the variants of GTA assume different trigger
definitions. Correspondingly, we consider three settings for
searching for potential triggers: (i) the trigger gIt with topology
and features universal for all the graphs in D\y; (ii) the trigger
gIIt with universal topology but features adapted to individual
graphs; and (iii) the trigger gIIIt with both topology and features
adapted to individual graphs.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 12: MPC-based backdoor detection (ChEMBL → Toxicant): (i)-
(iii) triggers with universal topology and features, universal topology and
adaptive features, and adaptive topology and features; (a) benign GNN; (b)-
(d) trojaned GNNs by GTAI, GTAII, and GTAIII.
Results and analysis – We evaluate the backdoor search
method in the transfer case of pre-trained, off-the-shelf GNN
models (ChemMBL→ Toxicant). We sample 100 graphs from
each class (‘0’ and ‘1’) of the Toxicant dataset to form D.
For comparison, we also run the search on a benign GNN
model. All the attack variants consider ‘1’ as the target class.
Figure 12 visualizes the MPC measures with respect to each
class under varying settings of GNN models, backdoor attacks,
and trigger definitions.
We have the following observations. First, even on benign
models, the MPC measure varies across the two classes, due
to their inherent distributional heterogeneity. Second, on the
same model (along each column), the measure decreases as
the trigger definition becomes more adaptive because tailoring
to individual graphs tends to lead to less perturbation. Third,
most importantly, under the same trigger definition (along
each row), GTAI and GTAII show significantly disparate MPC
distributions across the two classes, while the MPC distribu-
tions of GTAIII and benign models seem fairly similar, imply-
ing the difficulty of distinguishing GNNs trojaned by GTAIII
based on their MPC measures.
To quantitatively validate the above observations, on each
model, we apply the one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [42]
between the MPC distributions of the two classes, with the
null hypothesis being that the MPC of the target class is sig-
nificantly lower than the other class (i.e., detectable). Table 8
summarizes the test results. Observe that regardless of the
trigger definition, the trojaned models by GTAI and GTAII
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show large p-values (≥ 0.08), thereby lacking support to re-
ject the null hypothesis; meanwhile, the benign GNN and tro-
janed model by GTAIII demonstrate extremely small p-values
(< 0.001), indicating strong evidence to reject the null hy-
pothesis (i.e., the MPC of the target class is not significantly
lower). Thus, relying on MPC to detect GTAIII tends to give
missing or incorrect results. We also conduct additional statis-
tical tests (e.g., class-wise comparison of benign and trojaned
models), with details deferred to Appendix C.
Trigger p-Value of GNN under Inspection
Definition Benign GTAI GTAII GTAIII
gIt 2.6×10−9 1.0×10−0 1.8×10−1 5.4×10−7
gIIt 5.8×10−11 1.0×10−0 2.6×10−1 1.3×10−13
gIIIt 1.9×10−5 1.7×10−1 8.4×10−2 9.3×10−4
Table 8. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the MPC measures of benign and
trojaned GNNs (ChEMBL→ Toxicant).
We now provide a possible explanation for the above obser-
vations. Intuitively, NEURALCLEANSE relies on the assump-
tion that a trojaned model creates a “shortcut” (i.e., the trigger
perturbation) for all the trigger-embedded inputs to reach the
target class. However, this premise may not necessarily hold
for GTAIII: because of its adaptive nature, each individual
graph can have a specific shortcut to reach the target class,
rendering the detection less effective. Thus, it seems crucial
to carefully account for the trigger adaptiveness in designing
effective countermeasures against GTA, which we consider
as our ongoing research.
We have also evaluated the detectability of GTA under the
transductive setting (with details in Appendix C), which leads
to similar conclusions.
6 Related Work
With their widespread use in security-critical domains, DNNs
are becoming the new targets of malicious manipulations [3].
Two primary types of attacks are considered in the literature:
adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks.
Adversarial attacks – One line of work focuses on devel-
oping new attacks of crafting adversarial inputs to deceive
target DNNs [6, 18, 41, 50]. The attacks can be classified as
untargeted (i.e., the adversary desires to simply force misclas-
sification) and targeted (i.e., the adversary desires to force the
inputs to be misclassified into specific classes).
Another line of work attempts to improve DNN resilience
against existing attacks by devising new training strategies
(e.g., adversarial training) [20,27,40,52] or detection methods
[17, 33, 36, 64]. However, such defenses are often penetrated
or circumvented by even stronger attacks [1, 29], resulting in
a constant arms race.
Backdoor attacks – The existing backdoor attacks can be
classified based on their targets. In class-level attacks, specific
triggers (e.g., watermarks) are often pre-defined, while the
adversary aims to force all the trigger-embedded inputs to be
misclassified by the trojaned model [19, 32]. In instance-level
attacks (“clean-label” backdoors), the targets are defined as
specific, unmodified inputs, while the adversary attempts to
force such inputs to be misclassified by the trojaned model
[24, 25, 47, 49].
The existing defenses against backdoor attacks mostly fo-
cus on class-level attacks, which, according to their strategies,
include (i) cleansing potential contaminated data at training
time [53], (ii) identifying suspicious models during model
inspection [8, 31, 56], and (iii) detecting trigger-embedded
inputs at inference time [7, 10, 13, 16].
Attacks against GNNs – In contrast of the intensive re-
search on DNNs for continuous data (e.g., images), the studies
on the security vulnerabilities of GNNs for graph-structured
data are still sparse. One line of work attempts to deceive
GNNs via perturbing the topological structures or descriptive
features of graph data at inference time [12, 57, 68]. Another
line of work aims to poison GNNs at training time to degrade
their overall performance [4, 30, 69]. The defenses [58, 62]
against such attacks are mostly inspired by that for general
DNNs (e.g., adversarial training [34]).
Despite the plethora of prior work, thus far little is known
about the vulnerabilities of GNN models to backdoor attacks.
This work bridges this striking gap by designing, implement-
ing, and evaluating the first backdoor attack on GNNs.
7 Conclusion
This work represents an in-depth study on the vulnerabilities
of GNN models to backdoor attacks. We present GTA, the
first attack that trojans GNNs and invokes malicious func-
tions in downstream tasks via triggers tailored to individual
graphs. Through extensive empirical evaluation using bench-
mark datasets and state-of-the-art models, we showcase the
practicality of GTA in a range of security-critical applications,
raising severe concerns about the current practice of re-using
pre-trained GNNs. Moreover, we provide analytical justifica-
tion for such vulnerabilities and discuss potential mitigation,
which might shed light on pre-training and re-using GNNs in
a more robust fashion.
This work also opens up several avenues for further investi-
gation. First, while we focus on class-level backdoor attacks, it
is equally important to understand the vulnerabilities of GNNs
to instance-level backdoor attacks. Second, recent studies [39]
have shown that adversarial inputs and trojaned DNNs mutu-
ally reinforce each other; it is worth studying whether such
effects also exist for GNNs. Lastly, implementing and evalu-
ating other existing mitigation against backdoor attacks in the
context of GNNs may serve as a promising starting point for
developing effective defenses against GTA.
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Appendix
A: Implementation of look-ahead
Here we provide details of evaluating Eq (7). Applying the
chain rule to Eq (7), we have the following result:
∇gt`atk
(
θ′,gt
)−ξ∇2gt ,θ`ret (θ,gt)∇θ′`atk (θ′,gt) (14)
where θ′= θ−ξ∇θ`ret (θ,gt) is the updated parameter after the
one-step look-ahead. Note that the formulation here involves
a matrix-vector product, which can be approximated with the
finite difference approximation. Let θ± = θ± ε∇θ′`atk (θ′,gt)
where ε is a small constant (ε= 10−5). Then we can approxi-
mate the second term in Eq (14) as:
∇gt`ret (θ+,gt)−∇gt`ret (θ−,gt)
2ε
(15)
B: Default parameter setting
Table 9 summarizes the default parameter setting in § 4.
Type Parameter Setting
GCN Architecture 2AL
GRAPHSAGE Architecture 2AL
Aggregator Mean [21]
GCN (off-the-shelf) Architecture 5AL
GAT # Heads 3
Classifier Architecture 1FC+1SM
Training
Optimizer Adam
Learning rate 0.01
Weight decay 5e-4
Dropout 0.5
Epochs 50 (I), 100 (T)
Batch size 32 (I)
Attack
ntrigger 3 (I), 6 (T)
nio 1
nmask 100% (I), 10% (T)
Trigger Generator
Optimizer Adam
Learning rate 0.01
Epochs 20
Detection
# Samples 100 per class
Significance level α 0.05
λASR 80%
Table 9. Default parameter setting. I: inductive, T: transductive, AL: aggre-
gation layer, FC: fully-connected layer, SM: softmax layer.
C: Additional experiments
Here we list the results of additional experiments, which com-
plement § 4 and § 5.
Class-wise MPC comparison (ChEMBL→Toxicant) –
We conduct the Student’s t-test on the class-wise MPC distri-
butions of benign and trojaned GNNs in the transfer case of
ChemMBL→ Toxicant, with the null hypothesis being that the
two distributions are identical. The results are summarized in
Table 10. Regardless of the trigger definition, GTAI and GTAII
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feature small p-values ( 0.05), indicating strong evidence to
reject the null hypothesis; that is, their MPC distributions sig-
nificantly differ from the benign models. Meanwhile, GTAIII
has larger p-values, thereby lacking of support to reject the
null hypothesis; that is, the MPC distributions of benign and
trojaned models by GTAIII are not distinguishable, implying
the challenge of detecting GTAIII based on its MPC distribu-
tions. The results here complement Table 8.
Trigger GNNs p-Value of GNN under Inspection
label 0 label 1
gIt
GTAI 3.0×10−15 1.4×10−41
GTAII 4.8×10−12 1.6×10−5
GTAIII 1.4×10−1 6.7×10−2
gIIt
GTAI 1.6×10−31 5.5×10−26
GTAII 1.0×10−12 7.6×10−8
GTAIII 3.1×10−2 4.6×10−2
gIIIt
GTAI 7.5×10−6 8.4×10−19
GTAII 6.2×10−8 1.2×10−5
GTAIII 1.1×10−2 3.5×10−1
Table 10. Student’s t-test on the class-wise MPC measures of benign and
trojaned GNNs (ChEMBL→ Toxicant).
MPC-based backdoor detection (Toxicant→AIDS) –
We also apply the backdoor detection on the transfer case of
Toxicant→ AIDS, with results shown in Figure 13, Table 11,
and Table 12, which show trends similar to the case of Tox-
icant → AIDS in § 5, indicating the challenge of detecting
GTAIII on pre-trained GNN models.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 13: MPC-based backdoor detection (Toxicant→ AIDS).
Trigger p-Value of GNN under Inspection
Definition Benign GTAI GTAII GTAIII
gIt 2.7×10−2 1.0×10−0 9.1×10−1 3.9×10−2
gIIt 3.1×10−3 1.0×10−0 6.1×10−1 1.8×10−2
gIIIt 3.1×10−3 9.6×10−1 8.5×10−1 7.8×10−3
Table 11. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the MPC of benign and trojaned
GNNs (Toxicant→ AIDS).
MPC-based backdoor detection (Bitcoin) – We evaluate
the detectability of GTA under the transductive setting. Specif-
Trigger GNN p-Value of GNN under Inspection
Definition Class 0 Class 1
gIt
GTAI 3.5×10−28 5.2×10−51
GTAII 6.1×10−39 5.0×10−41
GTAIII 2.1×10−1 4.6×10−2
gIIt
GTAI 2.9×10−12 2.8×10−29
GTAII 1.7×10−16 6.2×10−21
GTAIII 3.8×10−2 4.4×10−2
gIIIt
GTAI 6.0×10−16 2.7×10−24
GTAII 3.9×10−18 4.6×10−31
GTAIII 2.9×10−1 5.6×10−2
Table 12. Student’s t-test on the class-wise MPC measures of benign and
trojaned GNNs (Toxicant→ AIDS).
ically, we search for a minimal trigger gt that, if replacing a
subgraph g randomly sampled from the given graph G, results
in large ASR (misclassification of unlabeled nodes within K
hops of g). In implementation, we set a threshold λASR (Ta-
ble 9). A trigger gt is considered as a candidate if it attains
λASR over 10 randomly sampled subgraphs (of the same size
as gt) from G. We then pick the candidate with the minimum
MPC as defined in Eq (13) as the detected trigger.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Figure 14: MPC-based backdoor detection (Bitcoin).
Trigger p-Value of GNN under Inspection
Definition Benign GTAI GTAII GTAIII
gIt 9.1×10−3 7.6×10−1 3.8×10−2 9.6×10−5
gIIt 2.8×10−4 5.5×10−1 7.9×10−3 2.3×10−3
gIIIt 2.8×10−4 4.4×10−1 5.9×10−4 4.3×10−3
Table 13. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the MPC measures of benign and
trojaned GNNs (Bitcoin).
Figure 14 summarizes the MPC measures with respect to
each class under varying settings of GNNs, backdoor attacks,
and trigger definitions. Note that the benign and trojaned
models by GTAII and GTAIII show similar MPC distributions,
different from GTAI. Table 13 further quantitatively validates
this observation. We apply one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test on the MPC distributions between the two classes on each
model, with the null hypothesis being that the MPC of the
target class (‘0’) is significantly lower than the other class.
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Observe that except for GTAI, the other three models show
fairly small p-values (< 0.04), indicating strong evidence to
reject the null hypothesis. Thus, relying on MPC to detect
GTA tends to result in missing or incorrect results.
More samples of trigger-embedded graphs – Figure 15
shows sample graphs and their trigger-embedded counterparts
under the transductive setting.
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Figure 15: Illustration of backdoor attacks on social networks from the
Facebook dataset [45]: (a) original graphs; (b) universal trigger-embedded
graphs; (c) adaptive trigger-embedded graphs.
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